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Arthur William Taylor is a colourful character. He is a long-serving prison inmate with a string of 
successful legal challenges brought on behalf of himself and prison inmates.  Self-styled “jailhouse 
lawyer”,1 he has no legal qualifications, limited access to legal materials, and only two hours each day 
Monday-Thursday to prepare his cases.2  Yet, Taylor has been remarkably successful in the cases he 
has brought, almost all of which he has argued in person.3 In 2009 the Inland Revenue Department 
assessed his taxable income at more than $100,000 from court-awarded costs.4 
 
This commentary examines one of Taylor’s cases decided by the Supreme Court in 2018.  In Attorney-
General v Taylor,5 the question was whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to grant declarations 
of inconsistency where legislation cannot be reconciled with a protected right under the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA).  This was the first case in which the High Court had granted such a 
declaration,6 and the Attorney-General appealed against the decisions below that the Court was 
seized of jurisdiction.7  The case involved the Key Government’s statutory ban on a prisoner’s right to 
 
1 “Jailhouselawyer” contracted into one word in his email address. 
2 Arthur Taylor letter to the writer, 9 December 2018. Taylor appeared before a parole board on 24 January 2019 
and was granted parole with a release date in February 2019. Taylor had served 40 years in prison and had 
appeared before parole boards on 19 occasions without success. 
3 For a sample of successful actions, see Taylor v District Court at North Shore (No 2) CIV-2009-404-2350, 13 
October 2010; Taylor v Chief Executive of Department of Corrections [2010] NZCA 371, [2011] 1 NZLR 112; Taylor 
v Manager of Auckland Prison [2012] NZHC 1241; Taylor v Manager of Auckland prison [2012] NZHC 3591; Taylor 
v Attorney-General [2013] NZHC 1659;Taylor v Attorney-General [2014] NZHC 1630; Taylor v Chief Executive of 
Department of Corrections [2015] NZCA 477, [2015] NZAR 1648; Taylor v Chief Executive of Department of 
Corrections [2015] NZHC 2196; Taylor v Witness C  [2017] NZHC 2610; Harris v Taylor [2018] NZCA 393; Attorney-
General v Taylor [2018] NZSC 104.      
4 “Career criminal earned six-figure income in prison” NZ Herald, 18 July 2010 
(http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10659514). 
5 Attorney-General v Taylor [2018] NZSC 104. This was one of two cases in the Supreme Court in 2018 brought 
by Taylor.  See also Ngaronoa v Attorney-General [2018] NZSC 123. 
6 Taylor v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706, [2015] 3 NZLR 791. 
7 Taylor v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706, [2015] 3 NZLR 791; Attorney-General v Taylor [2017] NZCA 215, 
[2017] 3 NZLR 24;  
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vote in a general election.8 On appeal, it was common ground that the statutory ban was inconsistent 
with the right to vote affirmed in s 12(a) of the NZBORA.9 
 
Two questions were set down for appeal: whether the Court of Appeal was correct to find that the 
High Court had jurisdiction to grant the declaration, and whether Taylor had stranding to be a party 
to the proceeding.  The Supreme Court by a majority of 3:2 dismissed the Attorney-General’s appeal, 
and unanimously granted Taylor’s cross-appeal on standing.10  The majority judgments are the joint 
judgment of Glazebrook and Ellen France JJ, and the judgment of Elias CJ.  William Young and O’Regan 




The Attorney-General’s two primary arguments focused on the scheme of the NZBORA and the nature 
of the judicial function.  First, s 4 of the NZBORA (inconsistent legislation prevails) contemplates the 
enactment of statutes that the courts may consider are inconsistent with the protected rights or 
freedoms.  It followed, the Attorney argued, that such legislation could not be treated as a breach of 
the NZBORA requiring remedy.  Legislation inconsistent with the NZBORA does not breach the 
protected rights but rather changes their scope. Secondly, the Attorney argued that a declaration of 
inconsistency is an advisory opinion that falls outside the judicial function and the High Court’s 
jurisdiction.11 There was no dispute that the prisoners’ voting ban was inconsistent with the NZBORA 
and no action can be taken in relation to the declaration. It determines no legal rights and conveys no 
consequences as between the parties.12 No oral argument in the Supreme Court appears to have 
addressed the second question set down for appeal – that of Taylor’s standing. 
 
Each of the majority judgments endorsed the courts’ commitment under the NZBORA to apply 
appropriate and effective remedies that can vindicate the protected rights.  The judgments affirmed 
the pioneering approach in Baigent,13 where the Court of Appeal developed the novel remedy of 
public law compensation against the State for egregious breach of the NZBORA.14  The courts might 
draw upon the full range of remedial responses (including the remedy of declaration) and develop 
 
8 Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010 (NZ). 
9 Taylor v Attorney-General [2018] NZSC 104 at [2], [73]. 
10 Attorney-General v Taylor [2018] NZSC 104. 
11 At [25]. 
12 At [52]. 
13 Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA) [Baigent]. 




new remedies where there is no existing remedy.15  Glazebrook and Ellen France JJ observed that the 
NZBORA is an Act to affirm New Zealand’s commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, art 2(3)(a) of which provides that states parties undertake to ensure those whose 
rights are violated “have an effective remedy”.16  Their Honours added that, where legislation 
derogates from the NZBORA, the only effective remedy is a declaration of inconsistency.17 Elias CJ 
couched it as a matter of constitutional obligation.18  Section 3(a) states that the Act applies to each 
of the branches of government, including the judicial branch, which makes it a constitutional 
responsibility of the judiciary to declare legislative inconsistencies.  No express statutory conferral of 
jurisdiction was required, her Honour held, “because such powers of declaration are within the 
inherent jurisdiction of the High Court”.19 
 
The majority dismissed the first argument of the Attorney-General as “over-ambitious”.20  The 
Attorney argued that there is no breach of rights when Parliament enacts inconsistent legislation as 
the legislation abridging the right changes its scope.  The majority rejected this approach as being 
contrary to the scheme of the NZBORA and the fundamental nature of the protected rights.  For Elias 
CJ, the NZBORA “occupies a position properly described as ‘constitutional’”.21  Her Honour held that 
the NZBORA was immune to amendment by a side wind and could not be accomplished by 
inconsistent legislation.22  Express legislative amendment of the NZBORA itself would be required to 
alter the scope of the protected rights. 
 
The majority also gave short shrift to the Attorney-General’s second argument, that a declaration of 
inconsistency is advisory only and not part of the judicial function of adjudication. Elias CJ benevolently 
described this suggestion as “over-broad”.23  A declaration of inconsistency is a formal and 
authoritative statement as to the effect of inconsistent legislation on individual rights,24 and is 
vindication for a successful litigant whose rights are adversely affected.25  The Attorney-General 
sought in vain to rely on the decision of the High Court of Australia in Momcilovic v R.26  The High Court 
 
15 At [30], [38]-[39], [104]. 
16 At [41] per Glazebrook and Ellen France JJ. 
17 At [41]. 
18 At [117]. 
19 At [118]. 
20 At [102] per Elias CJ. 
21 At [102]. 
22 At [103]. 
23 At [95]. 
24 At [53] per Glazebrook and Ellen France JJ. 
25 At [101] per Elias CJ. 
26 Momcilovic v R [2011] HCA 34, (2011) 245 CLR 1. 
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held (3:2) that the granting of a declaration of inconsistency under s 36 of the Victorian Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 was not a judicial function, which rendered s 36 in breach of 
the constitutional vesting of judicial power.  Both majority judgments thought Momcilovic of limited 
relevance owing to Australia’s “very different constitutional and legislative circumstances”.27  The 
constitutional separation of powers in Australia lacks any comparison under New Zealand’s flexible 
constitutional arrangements.  
 
Finally, the Court unanimously granted Taylor’s cross-appeal on standing.  For Glazebrook and Ellen 
France JJ, Taylor was sufficiently affected as the 2010 Amendment expressly continued the prohibition 
on voting for long-term prisoners.28  The dissenting Judges, William Young and O’Regan JJ, agreed with 
Glazebrook and Ellen France JJ.29  For Elias CJ, Taylor had a direct interest in how the Court decided 
the case as its decision would affect any claim he may subsequently bring seeking declaratory relief.30  
The Attorney’s argument was of general application that declaratory relief is never available for 
legislative breach of the NZBORA.  
 
Dissenting judgment   
 
William Young and O’Regan JJ organised their dissent around a threshold distinction.  They 
distinguished between an indication of inconsistency made in resolving a dispute requiring the 
application of ss 4-6 of the NZBORA, and a standalone claim for a declaration of inconsistency.  The 
former were legitimate in resolving disputes involving the NZBORA, the latter were not.  Indications 
of inconsistency do not purport to be a remedy for breach of the NZBORA but are a step in the court’s 
reasoning to resolve a dispute before it.31  For the minority, a legislative inconsistency did not amount 
to a breach of the NZBORA for which the courts should fashion a civil remedy: “After all, s 4 
[inconsistent legislation prevails] removes the only effective remedy from consideration.”32  
 
 
27 Attorney-General v Taylor [2018] NZSC 104 at [111] per Elias CJ.  See also at [60]-[63] per Glazebrook and Ellen 
France JJ. 
28 At [69]. 
29 At [145]. 
30 At [120]. 
31 At [125]. 
32 At [131], [133]. 
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Their Honours drew support from other jurisdictions where the Bill of Rights expressly authorises the 
granting of declarations of inconsistency.33  The purpose of such declarations, they reasoned, is not to 
provide a remedy for breach but to draw the inconsistency to the legislature’s attention with a view 
to prompting legislative reconsideration.34  William Young and O’Regan JJ contrasted declarations of 
inconsistency under the NZBORA which, they reasoned, do not have legal consequences: they simply 
“hang in the air” and do nothing, with the consequential risk that a formal order of the court might be 
simply ignored.35  Their Honours conceded the desirability of vindicating rights but disputed the 
efficacy of declarations of inconsistency:36 
 
 “We … query the extent to which a declaration provides vindication given that a declaration 




A primary contention of the Crown reduced to an unattractive argument: that Parliament was not 
subject to the NZBORA.37  The Attorney-General argued that inconsistent legislation does not breach 
the NZBORA but rather alters the scope of the protected right itself.  This argument seeks to engraft 
a major exception to the text of s 3(a).  This provision recites, in unequivocal language, that the 
NZBORA applies to each of the three branches of government, including the legislative branch.  Self-
evidently, legislation is a function of the legislative branch.  
 
In essence, the Crown’s argument engaged the doctrine of pro tanto implied repeal (inconsistent 
legislation amends the NZBORA by implication).  The Chief Justice dismissed this argument as denying 
the fundamental nature of the protected rights.  Of particular interest are her Honour’s rulings that: 
(1) the NZBORA is a constitutional statute,38 and (2) express legislative amendment of the NZBORA is 
required to alter the scope of a protected right.39  These rulings endorse sub silentio the landmark 
 
33 At [127], citing the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 (Republic 
of Ireland), the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 
(Vic).  
34 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 (Republic of Ireland), s 5(3); Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), 
ss 32(4) and 33; Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 36(6)(7). 
35 Attorney-General v Taylor [2018] NZSC 104 at [134]. 
36 At [139]. 
37 There is no question that the NZBORA applies to and controls Parliament’s non-legislative activities and 
operations.  See for example Police v Beggs [1999] 3 NZLR 615 (HC) (the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
could not invoke an occupier’s rights under the Trespass Act 1980 in a manner that unreasonably deprived 
persons of their rights of political protest and assembly under the NZBORA).   
38 Attorney-General v Taylor [2018] NZSC 104 at [102]. 
39 At [103]. 
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decision in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council,40 where Laws LJ recast the boundaries of implied repeal.  
Constitutional or human rights statutes were immune from implied amendment or repeal. “Ordinary 
statutes may be impliedly repealed,” Laws LJ declared: “Constitutional statutes may not.”41  Thoburn 
rejected the formalist legal method of implied repeal (later statutes in time prevail) in preference for 
a substantive method of reconciling legislation that accords primacy to constitutional and human 
rights statutes. 
 
Elias CJ’s rulings are immensely important for New Zealand public law.  Thoburn has never been 
followed in the New Zealand courts but now there is an equivalent precedent. It is fitting to place the 
reasoning of Thoburn and the Chief Justice in broader perspective:42 
 
 “The ruling in Thoburn completes what had been building in the English and New Zealand 
courts.  Recent decisions had acknowledged that Parliament could override fundamental 
rights but only by using emphatic language.  In a series of decisions, the courts had refused to 
allow general or ambiguous legislation to override or abrogate common law rights.  Laws LJ’s 
contribution was in linking the doctrine of implied repeal to the common law rights 
movement.  Its redefined scope made explicit the responsibility of the political branch when 
legislating in the field of constitutional or human rights.  Parliament might abrogate rights but 
only through targeted language that would demand public explanation.  For Lord Hoffmann: 
‘Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost’.  The 
principle of legality demanded no less.”    
 
The contention of the dissenting judges that a declaration of inconsistency is not a remedy (and 
certainly not an effective remedy) is tenuous at best.  The assumption is that, to be a remedy, it must 
be effective, meaning that some consequential relief must be available. A declaration of inconsistency 
would “simply hang in the air” with no legal consequences, and would be no remedy at all.43  On the 
contrary, a declaration of inconsistency does have legal consequences.  It is a formal and authoritative 
pronouncement of the effect of inconsistent legislation on the rights of individuals, and it operates to 
vindicate the rights themselves.  Rights have value, even if inconsistent legislation may override them 
 
40 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (admin), [2003] QB 151. 
41 At [63].  For analysis, see G Marshall “Metric Measures and Martyrdom by Henry VIII Clause” (2002) 118 LQR 
493; PA Joseph “Constitutional Law” [2002] NZ Law Rev 387 at 416-420; PA Joseph Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2014) at [15.4.6(2)].   
42 PA Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2014) 
at [15.4.6(2)] (footnotes omitted).  The dictum of Lord Hoffmann is from R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Simms [2002] 2 AC 115 (HL) at 131.  
43 Attorney-General v Taylor [2018] NZSC 104 at [134]. 
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(s 4).  Moreover, not all remedies contemplate consequential relief.  Under New Zealand’s Declaratory 
Judgments Act 1908, binding declarations of right may be made whether or not consequential relief 
is or could be claimed.44       
 
Finally, the Court held unanimously that Taylor had standing to be a party to the action.  This answered 
the second question on which leave to appeal was granted.  Curiously, no question of Taylor’s standing 
was raised by the Crown in either of the courts below.45  The Court of Appeal, without hearing 
argument, held that Taylor lacked standing.  Ruling on a matter that was not in issue and on which the 
Court did not seek submissions is an unexplained breach of Taylor’s right to the protection of natural 
justice.46  He was “not heard” on an issue that, for him, was determinative of the case (subject to his 
right to apply for leave to appeal).  A redeeming feature of the Supreme Court’s decision was that all 




The dissenting Judges can be commended for their candour.  Taylor was not an open and shut case 
but one that turned on the “better view”.47  The decision might have gone either way, depending on 
the judicial predisposition:  the majority Judges took an expansive view of the judicial role, the 
dissenting Judges a narrow view.  How the respective views broke down predetermined the outcome 
of the case.  
 
If predisposition be the determinant, then this commentator plumps for the majority view and the 
expansive role of courts under the NZBORA.  Declarations of inconsistency perform dual public 
functions in addition to the vindication of victims’ rights: they promote the concept of “dialogue” and 
the interdependence of the political and judicial branches,48 and they contribute to a robust rights 
culture.  Rights derogations should be the subject of open and informed debate in which the courts 
have a role to play.  Encouraging that role through declarations of inconsistency does not challenge 
the constitutional architecture or existing balance between courts and legislature.  Parliamentary 
sovereignty remains on its pedestal (inconsistent legislation prevails notwithstanding the NZBORA) 
 
44 Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 (NZ), s 2. 
45 Taylor v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706, [2015] 3 NZLR 791; Attorney-General v Taylor [2017] NZCA 215, 
[2017] 3 NZLR 24. For acknowledgement see Attorney-General v Taylor [2018] NZSC 104 at [17], [68]. 
46 Both at common law and under the NZBORA, s 27(1). 
47 Attorney-General v Taylor [2018] NZSC 104 at [122]. 
48 For political-judicial dialogue, see PA Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, 
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2014) at [21.2.5].  For the interdependence of the political and judicial branches, 
see PA Joseph “Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise” (2004) 15 KCLJ 321.  
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but is no longer beyond reproach.  Parliament is held to account for its legislation whenever the courts 
formally declare that it has legislated in breach of protected rights.  Declarations of inconsistency 
under the NZBORA inform the equilibrium that maintains the constitutional balance between the 
political and judicial branches.   
 
It seems almost incongruous today to doubt the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to grant 
declarations aimed at highlighting rights-departures.  Declaratory relief is part of the judicial armoury.  
In Burt v Governor-General,49 the Court of Appeal struck out an application for judicial review under 
the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 (NZ), as there was no purported exercise of a statutory power or 
statutory power of decision (as required under that Act). The applicant had challenged the refusal of 
the Governor-General to exercise the Royal prerogative of mercy.  The Court did not treat the non-
statutory nature of the prerogative as fatal, as the appeal might be transformed into “a simple action 
for a declaration, which has very wide scope in the 20th century”.50  One of the major judicial 
achievements last century was the honing of the remedy of declaration to escape the constraints that 
checked the scope of the prerogative remedies (certiorari and prohibition).51  Declaratory relief would 
issue notwithstanding decision-makers were under no duty to act judicially, and no rights of a 
justiciable nature were affected.52  The remedy gave courts the flexibility to achieve administrative 
justice in ways that were not previously possible. Given these macro-developments in administrative 





Access to justice has value in its own right. A long-serving prison inmate helped resolve an important 
question of public law. It was a question that had remained unsettled for considerable time, with 
doubts over the High Court’s jurisdiction arising shortly after the enactment of the NZBORA.53  In 2010 
one Judge remarked that it was “curious” no New Zealand court had issued a declaration of 
inconsistency.54 Arthur Taylor did a service in resolving this long-standing issue of public law. The New 
 
49 Burt v Governor-General [1992] 3 NZLR 672 (CA). 
50 At 676. 
51 See PA Joseph “False dichotomies in Administrative Law: From There to Here” [2016] NZ L Rev 127 at 131-134.  
52 Contrast The King v Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Company (1020) Ltd 
[1924] 1 KB 171 (CA) at 205 per Atkin LJ apropos certiorari and prohibition.   
53 See Temese v Police (1992) 9 CRNZ 425 (CA) at 427. 




Zealand courts should be complimented for openly availing their services, notwithstanding a person’s 






















          
 











   
 
    
 
 
   
 
 
